It has been suggested that the algebraic structure of AES (and other similar block ciphers) could lead to a weakness exploitable in new attacks. In this paper, we use the algebraic structure of AES-like ciphers to construct a novel cipher embedding where the ciphers may lose their non-linearity. We show some examples and we discuss the limitations of our approach.
Introduction
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [Nat01] is nowadays the most widespread block cipher in commercial applications. It represents the stateof-art in block cipher design and provides an unparalleled level of assurance against all known cryptanalytic techniques, except for its round-reduced versions. It is true that AES (and other modern block ciphers) presents a highly algebraic structure, leading researchers to exploit it for new algebraic attacks, but these tries have been unsuccessful as yet (except for academic reduced versions).
The best that one can hope for a cryptosystem is that all its encryption functions behave in unpredictable way (close to random), in particular we would like that it behaves in a way totally different from linear or affine maps.
A sign of strength for AES is that nobody has been able to show that its encryption functions are any closer to linear maps than arbitrary random functions. However, it might be possible to extend AES to act on bigger spaces, in such a way that the non-random behavior of AES becomes easier to spot. For example, it was hoped that embedding AES into BES would allow easier 1 polynomial systems to break the ciphers (see [MR02] , [TZ05] ). Generally speaking, the worst scenario consists of a space large enough to make AES linear but small enough to allow practical computations. This is probably not possible. Our goal is to find a space small enough to allow practical computations but large enough to identify a specific behavior of AES, showing that it is closer to linear maps than expected.
In Section 1, after some basic algebraic background, we explain our point of view on block ciphers. In particular, we introduce the class of translation based cryptosystems, which are ciphers enjoying some interesting algebraic properties. We also briefly describe the three main translation-based cryptosystems: AES, SERPENT and PRESENT.
For completeness, in Section 2 we list the best-known attacks on roundreduced versions of AES.
In Section 3 we provide formal techniques to construct a larger space on which the block cipher can act. We call these techniques space embeddings. In the case of translation-based ciphers, these embeddings are designed to lower the non-linearity of the encryption functions. We present one specific embedding and we obtain several results on the rank distributions for matrices in the larger space, which are useful to mount attacks.
In Section 4 we present a larger embedding, that apparently works well with AES and other translation-based systems. The effectiveness of this embedding depends heavily on properties of the mixing-layer.
In Section 5 we outline our approach to attack translation-based ciphers (including AES) with our embeddings. Although we have not been able to find an attack giving satisfactory statistical evidence, we have some partial data suggesting that our methods may work, as reported in [RSB10] In Section 6 we discuss further on our non-linearity notion:
• first, we report results from [Mai09] , [MRS10] on embeddings where the decrease in non-linearity can be formally proved;
• then, we propose alternative embeddings highlighting their flaws;
• finally, with group theory proofs we also show that it is very unlikely that a representation/embedding can completely linearize any version of AES.
Preliminaries
In this section we recall well-known results in group theory and finite field theory [LN97] in order to fix the notation we will use in the sequel. We also outline some basic ideas about block ciphers and we recall the structure of three well-known cryptosystems: AES, SERPENT and PRESENT.
Group representations
Let n ≥ 2 be an integer. Let V = (F 2 ) n be the vector space over the finite field F 2 of dimension n. We denote by Sym(V ) and Alt(V ), respectively, the symmetric and alternating group on V . For any N, we denote by Sym N and Alt N , respectively, the symmetric and alternating group on {1, . . . , N}. Clearly Sym(V ) is isomorphic to Sym 2 n (the same for the alternating group). We denote by GL(V ) the group of all linear permutations of V . We recall the well-known formulas:
Given a finite group G, we say that G can be linearized if there is an injective morphism ρ : G → GL(V ) (this is called a "faithful representation" in representation theory). If G can be linearized, then, for any element g ∈ G, we can compute a matrix M g corresponding to the action of g over V (via ρ). The matrix computation is easy, since it is enough to evaluate g on a basis of V . If ρ : G → GL(V ) is a representation of G on V , then we often write vg instead of vρ(g), if no confusion arises. Also, G is said to act linearly on V , and V is called a G-module. The degree of the representation is by definition the dimension of V . If we consider Sym N , we can always linearize Sym N over V via the so-called regular representation as follows. Let V be a vector space with basis {e 1 , . . . , e N }. The regular representation ρ : Sym N → GL(V ) is defined by (e i )ρ(g) = e ig . In other words, any permutation in Sym N is associated to a permutation (N × N) matrix (and viceversa).
Since any finite group G can be embedded in Sym N for a smallest N, we can always linearize G using the regular representation. But of course this is huge and usually impractical.
Finite Fields
For any prime p and any positive m ∈ N, F p m is the field with p m elements (unique up to field isomorphism). It contains an isomorphic copy of F p and can thus be thought as an extension of F p . On the other hand, we can construct any F q s from F q with q = p m elements, as follows.
Let f ∈ F q [x] be an irreducible polynomial of degree m. We can consider the quotient R = F q [x]/(f ), where (f ) is the ideal generated by f in F q [x] . By considering the natural projection π : F q [x] → R, we call α = π(x) and clearly any element of R can be uniquely expressed as a polynomial in α of degree less than m:
with the condition f (α) = 0.
Theorem 1.1. R = F q [x]/(f ) is a field and R ∼ = F q m .
We denote by F * q the multiplicative group of non-zero elements of F q .
Theorem 1.2. For any finite field F q , the multiplicative group F * q is cyclic.
A generator of the cyclic group F * q is called a primitive element of F q . Definition 1.3. An irreducible polynomial f ∈ F q [x] is primitive if its roots are primitive elements.
Note that for any q and m there are indeed irreducible polynomials of degree m over F q and some of them are primitive.
Permutation polynomials
Definition 1.4. A polynomial f ∈ F q [x] is a permutation polynomial of F q if the associated polynomial function f : c → f (c) from F q into F q is a permutation of F q . If f is an affine map f : x → ax + b (a = 0), we say that f is a linear polynomial.
We note the following easy results:
(1) Every linear polynomial over F q is a permutation polynomial of F q .
(2) The monomial x n is a permutation polynomial of F q if and only if gcd(n, q − 1) = 1.
Permutation polynomials of F q of degree less then q can be combined by the operation of composition and subsequent reduction modulo x q − x. The set of permutation polynomials of F q of degree less then q forms a group, which is isomorphic to Sym(F q ). Then, the symmetric group Sym(F q ) and its subgroups can be represented as groups of permutation polynomials. Theorem 1.5. For q > 2, the symmetric group Sym(F q ) is generated by x q−2 and all linear polynomials over F q .
Block ciphers
Block ciphers form an important class of cryptosystems in symmetric key cryptography. These are algorithms that encrypt and decrypt blocks of data (with fixed length
2 ) according to a shared secret key. We can formally describe such a cryptosystem using the following definition: Definition 1.6. A cryptosystem is a pair (M, K), where:
• M is a finite set of possible messages (plaintexts, ciphertexts);
• K, the key-space, is a finite set of possible keys;
• we have encryption and decryption functions for any key k ∈ K:
Following the most used structure in modern ciphers, in the previous definition we set that the plaintext space coincides with the ciphertext space. W.l.o.g, we can consider M = (F q ) r and K = (F q ) ℓ , with r and ℓ positive integers, and we change slightly our previous definition. Definition 1.7. Let r and ℓ be natural numbers. Let φ be any function
For any k ∈ (F q ) ℓ , we denote by φ k the function
We say that φ is a algebraic block cipher if φ k is a permutation of (F q ) r for any key k ∈ (F q ) ℓ .
Under this conditions, we can also consider a block cipher as an indexed set of permutations (
r for some r ∈ N, we can consider φ k ∈ Sym(V ).
To achieve the desired security, most modern block ciphers are iterated ciphers that typically incorporate sequences of permutation and substitution operations. In fact, according to the ideas that Shannon proposed in his seminal paper [Sha49] , the encryption process takes as input a plaintext and a random key and so proceeds through N similar rounds. In each round (except possibly for a couple, which may be slightly different) the iterated ciphers perform a non-linear substitution operation (or S-box) on disjoint parts of the input that provides "confusion", followed by a permutation (usually a linear/affine transformation) on the whole data that provides "diffusion". A cryptosystem reaches "confusion" if the relationship between plaintext, ciphertext and key is very complicated. The "diffusion" idea consists of spreading the influence of all parts of the input (plaintext and key) to all parts of the ciphertext. The operations performed in a round form the round function. The round function at the ρ-th round (1 ≤ ρ ≤ N) takes as inputs both the output of the (ρ − 1)-th round and the subkey k (ρ) (also called round-key). Any round key k (ρ) is constructed starting from a master key 3 k of some specified length, e.g. k ∈ K = (F 2 ) ℓ (nowadays we have 2 64 ≤ |K| ≤ 2 256 ). The key schedule is a public algorithm (strictly dependent on the cipher) which constructs N + 1 subkeys (
Several independent formal definitions have been proposed for iterated block ciphers (or subclasses of them). Stinson in [Sti95] gives the following definition of substitution permutation network (SPN for short). In [DR02] we can find another class of iterated block cipher, called the key-alternating block ciphers. Now, we consider a more recent definition [CDS09] that defines a class (see Definition 1.9), large enough to include some common ciphers, yet restricted enough to have simple criteria guaranteeing an interesting property of the cipher (for details see Subsection 6.3).
Let V = (F 2 ) r with r = mb, b ≥ 2. The vector space V is a direct sum
where each V i has the same dimension m (over F 2 ). For any v ∈ V , we will
. Also, we consider the projections
, is a bricklayer transformation (a "parallel map") and any γ i is a brick. The maps γ i 's are traditionally called S-boxes and map γ is called a "parallel S-box". A linear (or affine) map λ : V → V is traditionally called a "Mixing Layer" when used in composition with parallel maps. We denote by σ v a translation over V . Definition 1.8. A linear map λ ∈ GL(V ) is a proper mixing layer if no sum of some of the V i (except {0} and V ) is invariant under λ.
We can characterize the "translation based" class by the following 3 also called session key.
Definition 1.9. We say that C is translation based (tb) if:
• it is the composition of a finite number of rounds, such that any round τ k can be written 4 as γλσk, where · γ is a round-dependent bricklayer transformation (but it does not depend on k), · λ is a round-dependent linear map (but it does not depend on k), ·k is in V and depends on both k and the round (k is called a "round key");
• for at least one round we have (at the same time) that λ is proper and that the map K → V , k →k, is surjective (a "proper" round).
In [CDS09] the authors gave several non-trivial remarks that can be useful. Let us recall the principal ones. Remark 1.10. A generalization is obtained by allowing a key-independent permutation at the beginning and/or another at the end. This is the case for example for the SERPENT cipher. Since these permutations have no influence on the cryptanalysis of a cipher, they can be ignored. Remark 1.11. A round consisting of only a translation is still acceptable, by assuming γ = λ = 1 V (the identity map on V ), although obviously it is not proper. Indeed, we can always assume that the first round is of this kind, otherwise we can remove its γ and λ (Remark 1.10). Then, we can also assume that 0γ = 0, since we can add 0γ to the round key of the previous round. If the previous round is proper, it remains proper since σ 0γ is a permutation over V . Remark 1.12. To allow affine mixing layers, rather than linear mixing layers, seems a generalization. However, this case is indeed already present in Definition 1.9, since it is enough to change σ v to incorporate the "translation part" of the mixing layer. Remark 1.13. A generalization can be obtained by only requiring at least one of the rounds to be of the prescribed form (with a proper mixing layer). Although the authors' results still hold in this more general case, we do not know any interesting cipher of this kind.
Note that some famous ciphers, such as the DES, KASUMI and IDEA ciphers, cannot be seen easily as tb ciphers. Some of them (e.g. DES and KASUMI) are of Feistel type. They modify only one half of the cipher state in each round. It has been suggested that the Feistel ciphers suffer from a slow speed of diffusion compared to SPN (or key-iterated) ciphers.
In the Subsections 1.5, 1.6, 1.7 we are going to describe respectively AES, SERPENT and PRESENT as translation based cryptosystems 5 .
The AES-128 cryptosystem
Let M = K = V = (F 2 ) r with r = 128 and let x ∈ M be our plaintext, k ∈ K our random key and y = φ k (x) the corresponding ciphertext. Before describing the individual components γ, λ and σ k of the round function, we recall (see Section 1.2) that it is possible to identify (F 2 ) 8 with the field F 2 8 , via the quotient map
Internally, the AES algorithm's operations are performed on a two-dimensional array of bytes, called the State. It consists of 4 rows and 4 columns and each element of this matrix is one byte (i.e. an element of F 2 8 = F 256 ). At the start of the encryption process, the input x (the plaintext) is a vector in V and it is first changed into a 16-byte vector:
Each round performs its operations on the State and after the last round the State is "unwrapped" and "fills up" the output vector.
A preliminary translation σ k (0) , where k (0) ∈ (F 2 ) r is the first round key, is applied to the plaintext to form the input to the (Round 1). It means that we can consider a preliminary round (Round 0) such that γ = 1 V and λ = 1 V (see Remark 1.11). In order to obtain the ciphertext, other N = 10 rounds follow. Let 1 ≤ ρ ≤ N − 1. A typical round (Round ρ) can be written as the composition 6 γλσ k (ρ) , where
• the parallel map γ is called SubBytes and it works in parallel to each of the 16 bytes of the data;
• the affine map λ is the composition of two operations known as ShiftRows and MixColumns;
• σ k (ρ) is the translation with the session key k (ρ) (this operation is called AddRoundKey).
The last round (Round N) is atypical and is characterized by γλσ k (N) where the affine mapλ is only made by the ShiftRows operation. So we obtain our ciphertext y = φ k (x).
In the following, we analyze the structure of each component of the round function.
SubBytes
The vector space V is the direct sum V = V 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ V 16 where each
, where v i ∈ V i and γ i ∈ Sym(V i ). The SubBytes operation γ is composed by two transformations: the inversion in F 2 8 and an affine transformation. The inversion operation is the patched inversion 7 in F 2 8 (i.e. ϕ(x) = x 254 ). The affine transformation over F 2 consists of an affine mapping ξ : (F 2 ) 8 → (F 2 ) 8 , specified by an 8 × 8 circulant matrix over F 2 and a translation. The result of inversion is regarded as a vector in (F 2 ) 8 and the output is given by y = ξ(x), where 
Mixing Layer
The map λ : V → V is a composition of two linear operations: ShiftRows and MixColumns. The ShiftRows operation is performed as follows. Any byte (an element of F 2 8 ) in row i of the State, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, is cyclically shifted (towards left) by i positions, as follows: We can also represent the ShiftRows operation with the following 16 × 16 block diagonal matrix
where the matrix R is a permutation matrix over F 2 8 that represents the shift of one row by one position.
In order to describe the MixColumns operation, each column of the State can be treated as a four-term polynomial in F 256 [z] . Let c(z) be one such polynomial. Then each column is replaced by the result of the multiplication in
Note that a(z) is invertible in F 256 [z]/(z 4 + 1). On the other hand, we can see the MixColumns operation as a 4-block diagonal matrix, each block the same MDS matrix (i.e. all minors are non-zero):
Remark 1.14. This MDS property is used to ensure that the number of active S-boxes involved in a differential or linear attack increases rapidly, and the security of the AES against these particular attacks can be established.
Obviously, we can also see the whole Mixing Layer (λ linear operation) as a matrix M. We observe that the order of this matrix is quite small, i.e. M 8 = 1. (Also, both the order of ShiftRows and MixColumns are equal to 4.)
The SERPENT cryptosystem
Let M = V = (F 2 ) r , with r = 128. We consider K = (F 2 ) ℓ , with the fixed length ℓ = 128, although the key is designed with variable length. The encryption φ proceeds by N = 32 similar rounds and it works as follows:
• a preliminary permutation is applied π : V → V (this is not used for security, rather to ease the implementation);
• there is a preliminary translation with the first round key;
• N − 1 rounds with the same structure are applied, but using a different permutation, each composed of a key translation σ k , a parallel S-box γ and a linear mixing-layer λ (we denote the round ρ by Round ρ, with ρ = 1, ..., 31);
• the last round (Round 32) follows and it consists of the composition γλσ k where λ = 1 V ;
The decryption process is easily obtained by inverting every step of the encryption, using the inverse of the S-boxes, the inverse of the mixing-layer and the reverse order of the round keys.
Let ρ be a natural number such that 1 ≤ ρ ≤ 31. In order to describe a typical round (Round ρ) we have to specify how the components γ, λ and σ k are applied. We note that, after the permutation π : V → V , we perform a preliminary translation σ k (0) , where
r is the first round key.
We have to characterize each γ j (i.e. we have to construct each S-box). The eight S-boxes S 1 , . . . , S 8 of SERPENT were built "ad hoc" starting from the 8 fixed S-boxes of DES (see [ABK98] ). To each v j we apply the same S-
Then the linear transformation λ (described in [ABK98] ) and a final translation σ k (ρ) are applied. The last round (Round 32) is only slightly different. The only difference with a typical round is the replacing of the linear transformation λ by 1 V .
PRESENT: an ultra-lightweight block cipher
PRESENT is an iterated block cipher that consists of N = 31 rounds.
r with r = 64. Let K = (F 2 ) ℓ , where ℓ may be equal to 80 or 128. We consider only the PRESENT's version such that K = (F 2 ) 80 , since its authors recommend it in order to have a good performance. We are going to describe how the round function γλσ k (ρ) (in the ρ-th typical round) is performed. As in the AES and SERPENT cryptosystems, the encryption process starts with a preliminary round (Round 0) that consists of a parallel map γ = 1 V , a linear transformation λ = 1 V and the translation σ k (0) , where
r is the first round key. A typical round consists of the non-linear operation, called sBoxLayer, the linear transformation, known as pLayer and the sum with the round key.
The parallel map γ ∈ Sym(V ) used in PRESENT acts as
4 is given by the following table, using an hexadecimal notation: 2 Known attacks AES's structure has been used to carry out some innovative analysis. Such attacks tend to have a similar form:
• they identify a property holding for a few rounds with a good probability;
• they use special techniques to extend the attack to more rounds. Other researchers attack small scale variants of the AES, where also the message space and the key space are reduced (see e.g. 
First results
In the literature there are some ways of representing the same cipher (e.g. AES), like BES [MR02] or Dual Ciphers [BB02] , that could be useful for the cryptanalysis. Other ways of representing AES that exploit its structure can be found, for example, in [CMR07] . In this section we represent "AES-like" ciphers by embedding them into larger ciphers. In Subsection 3.1 we begin with We want to enlarge Ω to a set W such that:
(1) W is endowed with a vector space structure;
(2) the permutations can be extended to act linearly on the whole W .
In Subsection 3.2 we provide one specific embedding of AES-like ciphers that linearizes the non-linear part of these ciphers, but it fails to linearize the whole cipher. In particular our embedding can be applied to AES, PRESENT and SERPENT.
Some preliminary results
Let Ω be a set such that |Ω| = n, let Sym(Ω) be the symmetric group on Ω and let W be a vector space over a field F (not necessarily a finite field).
Moreover, φ(Ω) is the set of all admissible vectors (w.r.t. φ), the subspace φ(Ω) is the admissible space. Note that since φ(Ω) ⊂ φ(Ω) then φ(Ω) is the smallest subspace containing all admissible vectors. Generally speaking,
Note that the regular representation (see Subsection 1.1) can be considered as a space embedding φ : Ω → W with respect to the group G = Sym(Ω), where dim(W ) = |Ω| = n and φ : ω → b ω with {b ω } ω∈Ω a basis of W . Also, W = φ(Ω) .
A space embedding permits to construct a faithful representation of G, as explained in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let α : Ω → W be a space embedding with respect to G.
(1) we can define a mapφ : G → GL(W ), whereφ(σ) = A σ , for any σ ∈ G;
(2)φ is a group homomorphism.
Proof. 1. Obvious. 2. We have to prove thatφ(σσ
Using Definition 3.1, the following equality holds
we conclude that
Remark 3.3. In Definition 3.1 we require only that A σ exists, however in Theorem 3.2 we see that it is also unique. For example, for the regular representation any permutation σ ∈ Sym(Ω) defines a permutation σ ∈ Sym({b ω } ω∈Ω ) and so it defines a unique A σ ∈ GL(W ), which can be represented as a permutation matrix. Now, we are interested in a special case of space embedding where the set Ω is a vector space V = (F 2 ) r and W is the vector space (F 2 ) s , with s > r. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ s, let e i ∈ W :
Let σ ∈ Sym(V ) be any permutation over (F 2 ) r . We want to embed V into W by an injective map α and to extend σ to a permutation σ ′ ∈ Sym(W ) as shown in the following commutative diagram:
In order to do this, we have to define the permutation σ ′ ∈ Sym(W ). We say that σ ′ is an extension of σ. We seek a σ ′ that is linear on W . The following definition will be useful:
Definition 3.4. Let σ ∈ Sym(V ) and α be an injective map α : V → W . We say that σ is linearly extendible
Remark 3.5. Since we are considering the finite field F 2 , we note that σ is linearly extendible (via α) if ∀{v i } i∈I ⊂ V such that i∈I α(v i ) = 0 we have i∈I α(σ(v i )) = 0. In fact, an injective map defined on the set
into the set
is a bijective map, since the cardinality of the two finite sets is the same.
Let α : V → W be a space embedding. Let A = Im(α) = α(V ) and let T = A be the subspace (the admissible space) of W linearly generated by
In order to specify the behavior of σ ′ on (T \ A), which is the space of nonadmissible vectors in the admissible space, we have to consider two different cases:
(a) suppose that σ is linearly extendible. Let t ∈ T , we must have t = 1≤j≤ι a j , with ι ≥ 1, with
(b) in case σ is not linearly extendible, we define σ
We now define σ ′ on W \ T according to the two previous cases (i.e. depending on the behavior of σ on A). In case (a), let τ be the dimension of the subspace T . We consider any subset B of {e 1 , . . . , e s } such that |B| = s − τ and W is the direct sum W = T ⊕ B . It is obvious that B exists. Let w ∈ W , then w = w T + w B with w T ∈ T and w B ∈ B . Finally, we define
In case (b) we define σ
Lemma 3.6. If σ is linearly extendible, then σ ′ ∈ GL(W ).
Proof. We first show that σ ′ is well-defined on T . Let t = I a i and t ′ = J a j and suppose that t = t ′ . Since σ is linearly extendible, we have
and we have our thesis. Since σ ′ is linear on T and T is a finite set, in order to prove that σ ′ is bijective on T it suffices to show that ker σ ′ = 0. We have (by definition of linearly extendible)
Finally, we show the linearity on W . Let {w i } i∈I ⊂ W , we have to show the following equality
Since W is direct sum of T and B , each element w i in W can be considered as w i T + w i B and so we can write the following
It easily follows that (1) holds if and only if
Remark 3.7. The construction of σ ′ ∈ GL(W ) from σ linearly extendible (Definition 3.4) can be done similarly over any field.
We are now able to prove the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 3.8. Let W = (F 2 ) r and G ≤ Sym(V ). An injective map α : V → W is a space embedding with respect to G if and only if, ∀σ ∈ G, σ is linearly extendible.
Proof. Let α be a space embedding with respect to G. For any fixed σ ∈ G, there exists a map A σ ∈ GL(W ) such that α • σ = A σ • α. Now, let {w i } i∈I be a finite set such that w i = α(v i ) (for any i ∈ I) and i∈I w i = 0. Obviously we have
The converse immediately follows thanks to the previous lemma.
Remark 3.9. For a fixed α and σ, the map σ ′ is unique andα : G → GL(W ) is a representation of G, by Proposition 3.2. Remark 3.10. In the following we use A σ and σ ′ interchangeably.
A first embedding
We now apply the theory developed in the previous section to a specific space embedding 8 ε : V → W . Let us identify (F 2 ) m with the field F 2 m , via the quotient map
2 m by means of a primitive element γ of F 2 m (which is a root of p). The map ε ′ is defined as
Let b be a positive integer, let r = mb and s = 2 m b. Let V = (F 2 ) r and W = (F 2 ) s . We construct our injective map ε : V → W in the following way:
for any v j ∈ (F 2 ) m ( 1 ≤ j ≤ b). Note that ε is a parallel 9 map.
For simplicity of notation, we set e 1 = ε ′ (0) = (1, 0, . . . , 0
) and e i+1 = ε ′ (γ i ), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 m − 1.
8 which is called "α" in Subsection 3.1. 9 see Subsection 1.4.
We note that
Lemma 3.11. Suppose that i∈I e i = e h . Then h ∈ I.
Proof. It follows from w(e i ) = 1, for all i ∈ I.
The following lemma is easily proved:
Lemma 3.12. Let I be a finite index multiset such that {v
Proof. Since ε ′ maps each element of (F 2 ) m into the canonical basis of (
Proof. We define the elements z i,j = (e 1 , . . . , e 1 , e j ↑ i , e 1 , . . . , e 1 ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ b and 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 m . Note that z i,j = z h,ℓ for (i, j) = (h, ℓ), except for z 11 = z 21 = . . . = z b1 . We consider the set B = {z 1,1 } ∪ {z i,j } j≥2, 1≤i≤b . For instance, when m = 2 and b = 2, we have B = {(e 1 , e 1 ), (e 1 , e 2 ), (e 1 , e 3 ), (e 1 , e 4 ), (e 2 , e 1 ), (e 3 , e 1 ), (e 4 , e 1 )}.
Clearly, the cardinality of the set B is given by
We claim that the set B is a basis for the subspace Im(ε) . First, we prove that B is a linearly independent set. Suppose z i,j ∈ B such that (i, j) = (1, 1). By definition of B, the element z i,j is the unique element of B having a vector e j in position i. Thus, z i,j cannot be the linear combination (i.e. a sum) of any other vectors of B (see Lemma 3.11). Now, we have to consider the element z 1,1 . Let z 1,1 = (i,j)∈J z i,j . W.l.o.g., we can assume by Lemma 3.11 that there is (ī,j) ∈ J such that zī ,j = (e 1 , . . .). Since zī ,j = z 1,1 we can assume w.l.o.g. zī ,j = (e 1 , ej, e 1 , . . . , e 1 ), i.e.ī = 2. There is no other z i,j having ej in the second position. Therefore, the sum z 1,1 should contain a 1 in component m +j, which is impossible.
Next, we prove that B generates Im(ε) . To do that, it suffices to prove that every element of Im(ε) belongs to the subspace generated by B. If we consider an element w = (e j 1 , . . . , e j b ) ∈ Im(ε), we have
since (e j 1 , e 1 , . . . , e 1 )+ 
We construct the (|A| × 2 m b)-matrix H such that the i-th row is the image of the parallel map ε applied to the plaintext a i ∈ A, for i ∈ {1, · · · , |A|}:
We would like to determine the expected rank for such a matrix. Generally speaking, for a random (t × n)-matrix with entries in the finite field F q , we can use the following well known results:
Theorem 3.14 ([MMM04]). Let t, k, n ∈ N \ {0}, where k ≤ n and k ≤ t.
(1) The number of ordered k-tuples of linearly independent vectors in (F q )
(2) The number of k-dimensional subspaces of (F q ) n is given by the q-binomial
.
(3) The number of (t × n)-matrices of rank k with entries in F q is given by the following formula
We note that
By using the previous theorem, the relation in (4) and observing that
we immediately get the following corollary:
Corollary 3.15. Let q = 2 and suppose t < n. We have the following relations:
Corollary 3.16. Let q = 2 and suppose t = n. We have the following relations:
In other words, the probability that a (t × n) random matrix (t < n) with entries in F 2 has rank exactly t is significantly greater than the probability of having rank equal to t − 1 or t − 2 or less. Instead, the probability that a square (n × n) random matrix has rank n − 1 is the greatest. Remark 3.17. In theory, the previous theorem cannot be applied to our case because our construction imposes specific constraints, for example on the rowweight. However, in practice our ratio
approaches that of the Corollary 3.16 for t = dim F 2 ( Im(ε) ).
So, in order to point out the distribution of the ranks of our matrices we provide a bound on the number of the full-rank matrices.
Lemma 3.18. Let c = 2 m , let n = cb (n ≥ k) and z = dim F 2 Im(ε) . The total number of admissible vectors in Im(ε) is c b . The average number ξ(h) of admissible vectors in a subspace generated by h linearly independent admissible vectors is
Proof. An admissible vector can be any vector having weight 1 in any of the b components. There are c b such vectors. The whole space Im(ε) contains 2 z vectors. The subspace B generated by h independent vectors (V 1 , . . . , V h ) contains 2 h vectors. Of these, h are (V 1 , . . . , V h ) themselves (admissible) and one is the zero vector (non-admissible).
So B contains 2 h − h − 1 "other" vectors. To estimate how many of these are admissible, we simply multiply 2 h − h − 1 by the ratio (1) The number of (k × n)-matrices having rank k can be estimated by the following formulas
(2) The number of (k × n)-matrices having rank k − 1 can be estimated by the following recursive formula . On the other hand, if we add three or more admissible vectors we may get another admissible vector. As a consequence, if we are considering the i-th row, we must discard on average ξ(i − 1) vectors and so we can choose only among c b − ξ(i − 1).
(2) The set of the (k × n) matrices having rank exactly k − 1 is the disjoint union of two sets: a) those having the first k − 1 rows linearly independent (and so the k-th row dependent on the previous k − 1 rows); b) those having the first k − 1 rows linearly dependent (and so these rows have rank k − 2 and the k-th row is independent from them).
Therefore, the number of (k × n) matrices having rank exactly k − 1 is obtained adding the following two values a) the number of (k − 1) × n matrices having rank k − 1 multiplied by the number of all possible choices for the dependent row.
b) the number of (k − 1) × n matrices having rank k − 2 multiplied by the number of all possible choices for the independent row.
• The number of (k −1)×n matrices having rank k −1 is ρ(k −1, k −1), for k ≥ 2. In case k = 2, we have ρ(1, 1) = c b .
• The number of all possible choices for the dependent row is ξ(k − 1) for k ≥ 2; if k = 2, the possible choice is exactly one, since the only second row we can choose is the first rows.
• The number of (k −1) ×n matrices having rank k −2 is ρ(k −1, k −2) and it makes sense for k ≥ 3. When k = 2 we have to consider a matrix having exactly one row and with rank 0, so it is the zero row, but the zero row is not an admissible vector. In other words, when we have only two rows, the set in b) is empty. In case k = 3, we have ρ(2, 1) = c b , since the second row has to be equal to the first one.
• The number of all possible choices for the independent row is (2 z − 2 k−2 )( c b 2 z ) and it is true for k ≥ 5. For k = 3, we must choose a third row different from the first two. The first two are equal and so we have c b − 1 choices. For k = 4, we must choose a fourth row outside the space generated by the first three, but only two of the first three are distinct ans so we have c b − 2 choices.
Putting altogether we obtain our formula.
Application to AES
Because of the AES structure, we assign the following values to the parameters we have previously introduced. Let V = (F 2 ) r be our starting vector space with r = 128 and W = (F 2 ) s , s > 128. We need to establish s. We consider the quotient
is the AES-polynomial. So m = 8. According to the previous section, we consider ε ′ : F 2 8 → (F 2 ) 256 by means of a primitive element γ of F 256 , which is a root of the primitive polynomial
, and we define our parallel map ε : V → W , with r = mb = 128 and s = 2 m b = 4096, as
We have that dim F 2 Im(ε) = 4081, by Proposition 3.13. A tipical round function of the AES cryptosystem consists of the composition of two parallel maps (AddRoundKey and SubBytes operations) and two nonparallel maps (ShiftRows and MixColumns operations). We view the SubBytes (and AddRoundKey) operation as a parallel map π
where y i ∈ F 2 8 and π i ∈ Sym(F 256 ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 16. In the SubBytes case, each component π i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ 16, is composition of inversion operation and an affine map; in the AddRoundKey case, we have a sum with the round-key. By the Theorem 1.5 we recalled in the first section, we have that Sym(F 256 ) = ax + b, x 254 , where a, b ∈ F 256 . We note that a parallel map can be linearized using elementary results from Representation Theory.
Moreover, we claim that ShiftRows is linear over (F 2 )
4096 and that MixColumns is not linear over (F 2 ) 4096 , as follows. First of all, we recall the map that describes the ShiftRows operation:
(y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y 16 ) → (y 1 , y 6 , y 11 , y 16 , y 5 , y 10 , y 15 , y 4 , y 9 , y 14 , y 3 , y 8 , y 13 , y 2 , y 7 , y 12 ).
Denoting by y = (y 1 , · · · , y 16 ), we note that
The map sh is linearly extendible because i∈I ε(b i ) = 0 clearly implies the following equality i∈I ε(sh(b i )) = 0.
According to Lemma 3.6, it is possible to construct the linear map
and so the ShiftRows operation is linear over (F 2 ) 4096 .
Now, we show that the MixColumns operation is not linear over (F 2 )
4096 using the following counterexample.
Example 3.20. Let w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ∈ W such that w 1 + w 2 + w 3 = w 4 :
Now, we apply the MixColumns operation MC to each vector w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 obtaining the following
Then we have that MC
The third component of the previous vector is a sum in (F 2 ) 256 and it has weight equal to 3. So, the vector MC ′ (w 1 ) + MC ′ (w 2 ) + MC ′ (w 3 ) is an element of the admissible space but it is a non-admissible vector. Therefore, MC ′ (w 4 ) = MC ′ (w 1 + w 2 + w 3 ) = MC ′ (w 1 ) + MC ′ (w 2 ) + MC ′ (w 3 ) and so the MixColumns is not linear over W . It means that the extension of MC is not linearly extendible.
Remark 3.21. If all the AES operations were parallel maps, it would be possible to linearize the "full" cryptosystem because the set of the parallel maps is a group with respect to the composition operation.
Application to PRESENT
As for AES, we assign the right values to our parameters, according to PRESENT's structure. Let V = (F 2 ) r be our starting vector space with r = 64, and W = (F 2 ) s with s > 64. We consider ε ′ : F 2 4 → (F 2 ) 16 and we define our parallel map ε : V → W , with r = mb = 64 and s = 2 m b = 256, as
We note that dim F 2 Im(ε) = 241 (see Proposition 3.13).
A typical round function of the PRESENT cryptosystem consists of the composition of two parallel maps (addRoundKey and sBoxLayer operations) and one non-parallel map (pLayer operation). The addRoundKey (and sBoxLayer) operation is a parallel maps π
where π i ∈ Sym(F 16 ). In the sBoxLayer case, each component
is given by the table in Subsection 1.7; when π is the addRoundKey operation, we have only a bitwise sum with the round-key. Moreover, it is easy to see that pLayer is not linear over (F 2 ) 256 .
Example 3.22. Let w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ∈ W such that w 1 + w 2 + w 3 = w 4 and let ζ, η, ϑ, ξ, µ be distinct non-zero elements in F 2 4 . Suppose that
Now, we apply the pLayer transformation pL to each vector w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 obtaining the following
where
). Then, we have that
where the first component has weight 3, and so the pLayer is not a linear operation over W .
Remark 3.23. As in the AES case, if all the PRESENT's operations were parallel maps, it would be possible to linearize the "full" cryptosystem because the set of the parallel maps is a group with respect to the composition operation.
Application to SERPENT
Let V = (F 2 ) r be our starting vector space with r = 128. In order to identify the value of r ≥ s, where W = (F 2 ) s , we have to consider the map
We define our parallel map ε : V → W with r = mb = 128 and s = 2 m b = 512 as
The components of a typical round function are the parallel S-box, the affine transformation described in Subsection 1.6 and the translation with the round key. Obviously, key translation and S-box are parallel maps of type
where π i ∈ Sym(F 2 4 ). Similarly to what was done for AES and PRESENT, we could provide a counterexample to show that the linear transformation of SERPENT is not linear over (F 2 ) 512 .
Results on a larger embedding
In this section we provide another specific embedding that can be seen as an improvement of the former (2). Also the new embedding can be applied to AES, PRESENT and SERPENT. In Subsection 3.2 we considered Ω = V as a vector space and we found an embedding V ֒→ W such that the S-boxes and the key-additions become linear. However, in this way we lost the linearity of the Mixing Layer λ and so here we make a larger embedding where the linearity of λ is recovered, without losing the linearity of the key addition. We do lose the linearity of the S-boxes, but their non-linearity is probably kept low.
Starting from the setting we described in the previous section, we consider our parallel map ε : (
Now, let M be a matrix in GL((F 2 ) mb ) and let t be its order,
r be a vector space with dimension r = mb and let W = (F 2 ) s be the vector space with dimension s = 2 m bt. The space embedding α : V → W we propose in this section is defined as follows
From now on, α denotes the map in (5). Thanks to Proposition 3.13, we can easily prove the following proposition:
r be a vector space with dimension r = mb and let W = (F 2 ) s be the vector space with dimension s = 2 m bt. Let α be as in (5). Then we have
On the other hand, considering the projection of {(ε(v), ε(Mv), . . . , ε(M t−1 v))} on the first component (the first b bytes), the lower bound follows immediately, again considering Proposition 3.13.
We can further improve Proposition 4.1 for byte-oriented Mixing Layer.
r be a vector space with dimension r = mb and let W = (F 2 ) s be the vector space with dimension s = 2 m bt. Let M ∈ GL ((F 2 m ) b ). Let α be as in (5). Then we have
Proof. Let T = Im(α) . For any w 1 , w 2 ∈ W , let w 1 · w 2 denote their scalar product. It is sufficient to show that there exist (bt − 1) + mb(t − 1) elements in T ⊥ that are linearly independent, where T ⊥ = {w ∈ W | w · t = 0, ∀t ∈ T } is the orthogonal space of T (or the "dual" of T , in coding theory notation). In fact, this means
and since dim T = dim W − dim T ⊥ , our result could follows.
Consider the following matrix product with
We note that S i is a subspace and that
There exists a bijection via orthogonality between the sets
; their cardinality is obviously 2 m − 1. We can choose a linear basis for S ∪ {0}, i.e. S ∪ {0} = e ⊥ 1 , . . . , e ⊥ m . Therefore, each row of M generates m linearly independent elements of T ⊥ . Two relations coming from two different rows are independent, since the matrix M has full rank, for a total of mb relations. Now, we construct the elements of the orthogonal space that correspond to the relations induced by the rows of M. We are considering the case (v, Mv) and we observe that
where 
We have found exactly mb(t − 1) vectors in T ⊥ . Since the pairs (
Then we have mb(t − 1) independent relations (i.e. linearly independent elements of the orthogonal space).
Thanks to Proposition 3.13, we have exactly (bt − 1) further relations, corresponding to elements in T ⊥ of type (0, . . . , 0
with 1 ≤ k ≤ bt. The vectors (7) and (8) form clearly a linearly independent set.
As we have done in previous section, we can construct the following matrix. Let D be a subset of the plaintext set M such that |D| = dim F 2 ( Im(α) ). Let a i ∈ D, 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|. We construct the (|D| × 2 m bt)-matrix D such that the i-th row is the image of the map α applied to the plaintext a i ∈ D, for i ∈ {1, · · · , |D|}:
Remark 4.3. We expect the rank of this matrix to have a behavior similar to that of matrix H (3), see Remark 3.17. Our experiments confirm this. LetG be the set of parallel mapsπ : (
b , such that, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ b,π j (x) = ax + c, with a = 0, c ∈ F 2 m (a and c do not depend on j). LetḠ be the set of parallel mapsπ : (
Note that bothG andḠ are subgroups of Sym ((F 2 m ) b ) and we define G as
The following result holds:
Proposition 4.4. Let σ be either an element ofG or an element ofḠ, then there exists A σ : W → W which is linear.
Proof. We want to apply Lemma 3.6 and so we must only show that σ is linearly extendible. Let {v i } i∈I ⊂ V such that i∈I α(v i ) = 0, we have to prove that i∈I α(σ(v i )) = 0. Note that I α(v i ) = 0 is equivalent to
Then we have the following system S j for any 1 ≤ j ≤ b
Using Lemma 3.12, we have that S j is equivalent to S
Suppose σ ∈G which means that
wherec is a constant independent of ℓ.
We have that, ∀i ∈ I and for any 1
Thanks to Lemma 3.12, our thesis follows.
Suppose now that σ ∈Ḡ, i.e.
whered is a constant independent of ℓ and |{ℓ
is even. By Lemma 3.12, our thesis follows.
Application to AES
Let V = (F 2 ) r be a vector space with dimension r = 128 and let M : V → V be the MixingLayer of AES, that is, the composition of ShiftRows and MixColumns. Since M has order equal to 8 (i.e. M 8 = id V ), the map α : V → W we propose is defined as follows
where W = (F 2 ) s is the vector space with dimension s = 2 m bt = 2 15 and ε is the map defined in Subsection 3.3: ε : (F 2 ) 128 → (F 2 ) 4096 . Let T = Im(α) with α in (9). We can easily determine dim(T ).
Fact 4.5. In the AES case we have
Proof. Let λ = 2 m bt − (bt − 1) − mb(t − 1). By computational experiments, we have found a (λ × 2 m bt) full rank matrix for the α representation in the AES case. Which means dim F 2 T ≥ λ. Thanks to Proposition 4.2 we conclude that dim F 2 T = λ.
We note that the group
contains all the permutations of the AES-round function, except notably for the S-box operation.
Proposition 4.6. Let M be the MixingLayer. Then α is a space embedding with respect to G = G ,Ḡ, M .
Proof. According to Proposition 4.4, there exists a linear map A σ : W → W in case σ isG orḠ. We note that the previous result is independent from M.
. Obviously, we have that i∈I α(v i ) = 0 implies i∈I α(Mv i ) = 0.
With a fixed K, the encryption φ K is the composition of AddRoundKey, Subbytes and MixingLayer. So the only part of φ K which is not linear (with our map α) is the SubBytes operation.
Application to PRESENT
r be a vector space with dimension r = 64 and let M : V → V be the pLayer of PRESENT. Since M 3 = id V , the map α : V → W we propose is defined as follows
where W = (F 2 ) s is the vector space with dimension s = 2 m bt = 768. Let α be as in (10) and T = Im(α) . Also in this case it is possible to prove (with a computation) that dim F 2 (T ) = 2 m bt − (bt − 1) − mb(t − 1) = 593 With a fixed K, the encryption φ K is the composition of addRoundKey, sBoxLayer and pLayer. So the only part of φ K which is not linear (with our map α) is the sBoxlayer operation.
Application to SERPENT
r be a vector space with dimension r = 128 and let M : V → V be the affine transformation of SERPENT. Since the order of M is greater 11 than 2 116 , it is huge and impractical to consider the map α :
since W = (F 2 ) s would have s = 2 m bt > 2 4 · 32 · 2 116 = 2 125 , making the rank computation impossible with nowadays technology.
Attack strategies
In this paper we do not report on successful attacks on (full versions of) the AES or other well-known ciphers. It is true that we have implemented several attacks aiming at distinguishing AES from random permutations, presented in some talks, and that we have collected some data indicating that our approach is likely to succeed. Yet, our data do not provide an overwhelming statistical evidence for the full cipher versions. Therefore, in this section we sketch some attack strategies that we have followed, without giving full details.
The most difficult task in assessing the success of one of our embeddings is, by far, to estimate the non-linearity decrease of the cryptosystem. For example, a rigorous determination of the s-extendibility (Subsection 6.1) appears completely out of reach. The only methods we can use to estimate the non-linearity fall are "a posteriori" checks on linear dependences.
We have implemented only chosen-plaintex attacks, either with single-key or with related keys. In the single-key scenario, we proceed in three steps:
(1) we choose a set S of N (31745 × 2 15 )-matrices, with rows taken from T (Fact 4.5);
(2) we encrypt all matrices in S (row by row) with a given key and compute their ranks;
(3) we compare their rank distribution with the expected rank distribution for a set of N random (31745 × 2 15 )-matrices, with rows taken from T , aiming at distinguishing the two distributions; (4) to validate the distinguishing statistical test, we also create sets of N random (31745 × 2 15 )-matrices (in T ) and we compare them with the expected distribution, aiming at not distinguishing them.
In the related-key scenario we proceed similarly. Let n k be the number of related keys:
(1) we choose a set S of N (31745 × 2 15 )-matrices, with rows taken from T ;
(2) we encrypt all matrices in S (row by row) with all keys and compute their ranks;
(3) we compare their rank distribution with the expected rank distribution for a set of NN k random (31745 × 2 15 )-matrices, with rows taken from T , aiming at distinguishing the two distributions; (4) to validate the distinguishing statistical test, we also create sets of Nn k random (31745 × 2 15 )-matrices (in T ) and we compare them with the expected distribution, aiming at not distinguishing them.
Apart from the obvious difference in the dealing of the single-key/relatedkey mechanism, the two scenarios are very similar, since in both we hope to spot a significant deviation by looking at ranks. Matrix ranks do depend on the linear dependences of the rows and are much easier to compute and compare, so they are cheap indicators for the non-linearity behavior (see Marsaglia's test, e.g. [Sot98] , [NIS00] ). On the other hands, since a great deal of row dependences influence the rank, as indicators they are noisy and force us to collect a huge number of samples. To maximize the effect on the rank of our embeddings, we need to choose S with a very specific rank distribution, e.g. with matrices of extremely low rank (while keeping all rows distinct). A report on some experimental results can be found in [RSB10] .
Further remarks and other results
The first subsection contains some results on how our representation could achieve a weaker notion of linearity.
In Subsection 6.2 we report other thinkable representations, that unfortu-nately are impractical. The main objective in these constructions is to identify the right compromise between computational feasibility and quantity of information that can be obtained. Then, in Subsection 6.3 we prove the fact, using classical and easy arguments, that it is unlikely to embed the AES cipher into a linear cipher, unless one uses a huge-dimensional vector space (and so this embedding is useless in practice).
On a weaker notion of linearity
The results in this section are jointly with L. Maines and the proofs are contained in her Master's thesis [Mai09] (see also [MRS10] ), supervised by the second author. The main goal sought in Section 3.1, Section 3.2, Section 4, and Section 6.2 is to find practical embedding of (F 2 )
128 into a larger space where all components of the round function become linear. This is impossible, as shown in Section 6.3, but what we achieve in Section 4 is an embedding where the non-linear maps are "not so far" from linear maps. There are many notions of "nonlinearity", but none of them can be easily computed in our setting. When we say "not so far from linear", we mean that these functions behave with matrix ranks in a way similar to that of linear maps, as discussed in Section 5. However, we have been able to introduce a new non -linearity notion, that we call s-extendibility (Definition 6.1). We are not able to apply it in the embedding
but we can apply it 12 to
and so our definition and our results (the main results of this section is Theorem 6.6) should be seen as a step forward the complete understanding of the surviving non-linearity in (12).
Definition 6.1. Let V = (F 2 ) r and W = (F 2 ) s , with s > r. Let σ ∈ Sym(V ) and α be an injective map α : V → W . We say that σ is s-extendible (via
, then ∀α and ∀σ we have
So if we test the 4-extendibility of σ only on these sets of vectors, we will find that any σ is 4-extendible. We call these vectors "coupled vectors". We note that if σ is s-extendible ∀s ∈ N, then σ is linearly extendible, according to Definition 3.4. Moreover, any linear map is s-extendible for all s. A random map is a 2-extendible but (with high probability) it is not s-extendible for any s ≥ 4. Therefore, any 4-extendible map can be considered closer to a linear map. We would like to have results on our embedding concerning the s-extendibility of maps. A first result in this direction is obtained using the space embedding
where M is a (n × n)-matrix with entries in F 2 m , as we are going to explain. Definition 6.5. Given (x, y, z, a, b, c) ∈ N 6 and an (n × n)-matrix M, we say that (x, y, z, a, b, c) fits M if the following sums of elements of det(M) are non-zero:
• the sums having a number of elements equal to
The main result of this section is the next theorem that gives sufficient conditions on M in order to make all σ : V → V into 4-exendible maps.
Theorem 6.6. Let M be an (n × n)-matrix, with entries in F 2 m such that:
(2) all the k × k minors are non-zero (0 < k < n); (3) all sextuple (x, y, z, a, b, c) such that
Then any 4-related vectors are totally related if and only if they are coupled.
Thanks to Theorem 6.6 and Remark 6.2, we have the following Corollary 6.7. In the hypothesis of Theorem 6.6, any map is 4-extendible.
Other embeddings of this kind
We can also build other embeddings similar to those described in previous sections. The main objective in these constructions is to identify the right compromise between computational feasibility and quantity of information that can be obtained. In Section 3.2, we constructed the embedding ε that has been useful to make linear the S-box maps which are the classical nonlinear maps of a cryptosystem. We had to abandon the linearity of MixColumns (for AES) and the pLayer (in case of PRESENT). In order to use some more information about the MixColumns (or the pLayer for PRESENT), we have considered the embedding given in Section 4:
where M is the full Mixing Layer. The strength of this enbedding is that we can exploit the low order of M to force the linearity of M. The disadvantages are that we have lost some computational efficiency and that the S-box is non-linear again (but with a lower non-linearity). For AES, we considered also the embedding given by
since the order of the MixColumns is equal to 4 and the MixColumns operation was the only to be non-linear in Section 3.2. Unfortunately, in this context both the ShiftRows and the parallel maps are non-linear and so we put aside this idea. Although the following two embeddings could provide a lot of information about a cryptosystem,
• α(v) = (ε(v), ε((γλσ k )v), . . . , ε((γλσ k )) t−1 v)) (t = o(γλσ k )) they are very impractical, since the order of (M • Sbox) and of (γλσ k ) is huge.
On complete linearizations of AES
Let C be any block cipher such that the plain-text space M coincides with the cipher space. Let K be the key space. Any key k ∈ K induces a permutation τ k on M. Since M is usually V = (F 2 ) n for some n ∈ N, we can consider τ k ∈ Sym(V ). We denote by Γ = Γ(C) the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by all the τ k 's. Unfortunately, the knowledge of Γ(C) is out of reach for the most important block ciphers, such as the AES [Nat01] and the DES [Nat77] . However, researchers have been able to compute another related group. Suppose that C is the composition of l rounds (the division into rounds is provided in the document describing the cipher). Then any key k would induce l permutations, τ k,1 , . . . , τ k,l , whose composition is τ k . For any round h, we can consider Γ h (C) as the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by the τ k,h 's (with k varying in K). We can thus define the group Γ ∞ = Γ ∞ (C) as the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by all the Γ h 's. Obviously, Γ ≤ Γ ∞ . Group Γ ∞ is traditionally called the group generated by the round functions with independent sub-keys. This group is known for some important ciphers, for example we have It is very likely (and it is common belief among researchers) that Γ AES = Γ ∞ (AES) = Alt((F 2 ) 128 ). Assuming this, we discuss in this section the possibility of viewing Γ AES as a subgroup of GL(V ) with V of small dimension. In Cryptography it is customary to present estimates as powers of two, so our problem becomes to find the smallest ℓ such that Γ AES can be linearized in GL((F 2 ) 2 ℓ ). A classical proof is given in [Wag76] that ℓ = 128. We feel desirable to obtain a result with a simpler proof. Our estimate is weaker than Wagner's, but strong enough to show the linearization infeasibility.
There are two obvious ways to show that a finite group A cannot be contained (as isomorphic image) in a finite group B. The first is to show that |A| > |B|, the second is to show that there is η ∈ A such that its order is strictly larger than the maximum element order in B. Subsection 6.3.1 presents our result using the first approach and we show that ℓ ≥ 67, which is more than enough to ensure the infeasibility of the linearization attack. This subsection's argument is completely elementary. Subsection 6.3.2 present our result using the second approach and we show again that ℓ ≥ 67. It is interesting that, although here some more advanced argument is needed (results in number theory), we reach the same estimate.
First approach
In this subsection we show that the order of Alt((F 2 ) 128 ) is strictly larger than the order of GL(V ), with V = (F 2 ) 2 66 , so that ℓ ≥ 67.
We begin with showing a lemma.
Lemma 6.9. The following inequality holds 2 (2 7 ) 19 < 2 128 ! < 2 (2 7 ) 20 .
Proof. Let n = 2 7 , we have to show 2 n 19 < 2 n ! < 2 n 20 . We first show that 2 n 19 < 2 n !. The following inequality holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 and 1 ≤ h ≤ 2
Proof. If G < GL(V ), then |G| ≤ |GL(V )|. Therefore, ℓ = 66 is not large enough.
Remark 6.11. We could improve the previous bound to ℓ ≥ 68 by using the finite version of the Stirling fomula:
nlog 2 n−nlog 2 (e) ≤ log 2 (n!) ≤ nlog 2 n−nlog 2 (e)+log 2 n, n e n ≤ n! ≤ n n e n .
Using the order of the elements
In this subsection we compare the maximum order of elements in the two groups Alt((F 2 ) 128 ) and GL((F 2 ) 2 ℓ ). We use permutations of even order. We denote by o(σ) the order of any permutation σ, with σ ∈ Alt((F 2 ) 128 ) or σ ∈ GL((F 2 ) 2 ℓ ). The best available result for GL((F 2 ) 2 ℓ ) is given by the following theorem Moreover, there is σ ∈ GL((F 2 ) N ) whose order attains the upper bound.
Proof. It comes directly from Theorem 1 in [Dar08] , with p = q = 2 and N ≥ 4 (so point (a) and (b) do not apply).
As regards the order of the elements in Alt((F 2 ) 128 ), we would like to use the following theorem Theorem 6.13 ( [DM96] ). Let ν ≥ 3 and n = 2 ν . Then Alt((F 2 ) ν ) contains an element η of order (strictly) greater then e √ (1/4)n ln n .
The previous theorem is the special case of Theorem 5.1.A at p.145 in [DM96] when q = 2.
In order to be able to compare the two estimates coming from Theorem 6.12 and Theorem 6.13, we rewrite Theorem 6.13 as follows, in order to have o(η) even. Our proof is an easy adaption of the proof contained in [DM96] .
Theorem 6.14. Let ν ≥ 7 and n = 2 ν . Then Alt((F 2 ) ν ) contains an element η with o(η) > e √ (1/4)n ln n and o(η) even.
Proof. Let z be a prime number such that 4 + 3≤p≤z p ≤ n , where the sum runs over (distinct odd) prime numbers. Then Alt((F 2 ) ν ) contains an element η z = σσ ′ σ 3 · · · σ p · · · σ z such that: σ and σ ′ are transpositions, σ p is a cycle of length p, and all cycles {σ, σ ′ , σ 3 , . . . , σ z } act on disjoint subsets of (F 2 ) ν .
where ε ∈ R is circa 1.69. According to Theorem 6.14, the order of η is at least o(η) ≥ e 2 66 ε . If Alt((F 2 ) 128 ) ⊂ GL((F 2 ) N ), we then need the the smallest N such that o(η) ≤ (2 N −1 − 2) (Theorem 6.12). In other words we have to see when the following inequality holds o(η) = 2 2 66 ε ≤ 2 N −1 − 2.
We observe that
• if N = 2 66 , then (18) is false, since 2 2 66 ε > 2 2 66 > 2 2 66 −1 − 2;
• if N = 2 67 , then (18) is true, since 2 2 66 ε < 2 2 66 (1.7) < 2 2 67 −1 − 2.
Therefore, we need at least ℓ ≥ 67 in order to embed Alt((F 2 ) 128 ) ⊂ GL(V ), which is exactly the same value as in Proposition 6.10. Remark 6.15. It is shown in Landau [Lan03] that the maximum order of an element in Sym((F 2 ) ν ) is asymptotic to e √ n ln n as n → ∞ (with n = 2 ν ). Assuming this, we observe that we could slightly improve the value of ℓ we need to ℓ ≥ 68, which is the same as Remark 6.11.
